Chapter Three: Popular agency oversight of digital surveillance of communications and personal data for intelligence purposes: The case of Botswana

Many threats to the stability of modern states manifest themselves in organised and covert activities. The nature of the threats to the security of a state often requires intelligence services to use covert and intrusive means to counter the threats. Some of the methods used by intelligence services may infringe upon civil liberties. It is, thus, imperative to have in place oversight mechanisms that will ensure that, in the performance of their mandate, intelligence services respect the rule of law and the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual. This is especially important in democratic societies, where the respect for the rule of law and civil liberties are a sine qua non. The State of Botswana has since independence, embraced democratic rule and its intelligence services must respect the rule of law and the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual in the performance of their mandate. In other words, the sector must be accountable, which implies, among others, that it should be subject to oversight in the performance of its functions. Traditionally, oversight on the intelligence sector is exercised by organs of government, being the executive, judiciary and legislature, and in some cases, statutory bodies. It has, however, been observed that in many countries around the world, the traditional oversight mechanisms are not effective leading to an oversight deficit. The State of Botswana is one of those where the traditional oversight mechanisms have proven to be inadequate and/or ineffective. The oversight deficit in the intelligence sector challenges us to explore other complimentary mechanisms. This chapter explores the potential and use of popular agency on the intelligence sector in Botswana.