Chapter Five: Factors influencing public oversight of digital surveillance for intelligence purposes: The case of Mauritius

This chapter focuses on arguably the most impressive example of public oversight discussed in this edited volume, and one that has reduced the scope for surveillance overreach on a more sustained basis as popular consciousness of the dangers remain embedded in the social fabric. In 2013, the Mauritian government introduced the smart identity (ID) card to replace the previous National ID Card through a public-private partnership with Singapore, with the stated aim of cleaning up duplication in databases, but with considerable surveillance potential as it provided the government with a massive database of population data. The smart card contained a microchip and biometric data, including fingerprints, facial recognition data and a digital photo, and the biometric information was meant to be stored in a central population database. The Smart ID card faced opposition from the public, activists and civil society organisations, who were concerned that the government could use this information for surveillance purposes or to track the activities of citizens. Civil society organisations and activists launched campaigns to oppose the smart ID card. These included online petitions, social media campaigns, and public protests. There were also legal challenges filed against the implementation of the biometric card. 

Due to the public outcry, the government suspended the project in 2015 and changes to the Smart ID card system to address the public’s concerns. This chapter examines the factors that influenced public oversight of the digital Smart ID policy and the decision by the government to update data protection laws. It utilises an innovative mixed-theory approach to understand the dynamics of public oversight in Mauritius.