Chapter Six: Surveillance as a mechanism of political control in Mozambique: The structural environments for the failing of public oversight mechanisms

This chapter argues that Mozambican intelligence services have operated without effective oversight from either the other branches of the state, parliament, the judiciary or external audit bodies like civil society organisations and the media. The lack of proper oversight can be attributed to several factors, with the most significant being the political context of Mozambique’s authoritarian regime. This regime concentrates state power in the hands of the Head of State, who also serves as Commander-in-Chief of the Defence and Security Forces and utilises the intelligence services as a tool for popular surveillance.

The historical context in which the intelligence services were formed and developed in Mozambique has also contributed greatly to defining their current profile. The current intelligence services in Mozambique inherited the practices of the fascist regime of the Portuguese colonial state, which ruled Mozambique before political independence in 1975, as well as the intelligence practices used by the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) during the national liberation struggle. Furthermore, the establishment of the National Popular Security Service (SNASP) was the first intelligence service established when Mozambique gained its independence in 1975. Post-independence, Mozambique was under authoritarian one-party rule and in a context of civil war between FRELIMO and the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO). This greatly contributed to SNASP being a paramilitary service and used primarily to control perceived internal political threats by keeping watch on Mozambican citizens, who might support the rebel group, RENAMO. The current State Intelligence and Security Service (SISE) was created in 1991 in the context of establishing a multi-party democracy in Mozambique; however, it inherited anti-democratic practices from its predecessor, encompassing surveillance of citizens and non-accountability.

This chapter demonstrates this through a case study of popular surveillance by the Mozambican intelligence services, through an order issued by the government for the compulsory registration of mobile phone Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) cards and argues that there was no oversight of the intelligent services’ actions in this regard, either by the state’s balancing powers (Parliament and the Judiciary) or by civil society and the media.  The chapter is the result of documentary research relying mostly on Mozambique’s intelligence services, as well as historical documents combined with key-informant interviews (KII).